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█ Riassunto  Sintomatologia e politica razziale in Australia - Jindabyne (una pellicola girata da Ray Lawrence nel 
2006) si apre con l’uccisione di una giovane donna aborigena; tuttavia il punto su cui questa pellicola effettiva-
mente si concentra è il modo in cui la gente reagisce a questo delitto. Per questo motivo, questo film ci dice mol-
te interessanti verità sui rapporti interrazziali nell’Australia di oggi. La mia proposta è quella di leggere Jindaby-
ne come un’utile allegoria nazionale (nel senso dato a questo lemma da Jameson); il film è una mappa o una car-
tografia che ritrae i luoghi comuni politici e culturali nella fase storica attuale. Al fondo della mia ipotesi sta il 
fatto che non possa essere solo una coincidenza il fatto che Jindabyne dia un tale spazio al problema 
dell’apologia culturale in questa particolare congiuntura della storia australiana. Anche se questo aspetto del 
film ha avuto poco risalto in alcune delle recensioni che ne hanno accompagnato l’uscita, mi colpisce il carattere 
sintomatico della tempistica: si tratta di un tema che, come una volta Deleuze ebbe a dire a proposito della dif-
ferenza, era già nell’aria. Prodotto solo due anni prima dell’apologia nazionale ufficiale del primo ministro au-
straliano Kevin Rudd agli indigeni d’Australia il 13 febbraio 2008, Jindabyne risponde a un complesso insieme 
di problemi culturali che erano all’ordine del giorno della politica nazionale dal 1995, quando fu reso noto Brin-
ging Them Home, il rapporto della Commissione sulle Pari Opportunità e sui Diritti Umani relativo all’inchiesta 
di carattere nazionale vertente sulla cosiddetta “Generazione Rubata”. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Razza; Politica australiana; Diritti degli indigeni; Allegoria nazionale; Gilles Deleuze e Felix Guattari. 
 
█ Abstract  Jindabyne (a movie directed by Ray Lawrence, 2006) begins with the murder of a young aboriginal 
woman, but its real focus is the way people respond to this murder. In doing so, it tells several interesting truths 
about race relations in Australia today. I want to suggest that Jindabyne can usefully be read as a national allegory 
(in Jameson’s sense of the word). It maps or diagrams the cultural and political tropes of the present moment in 
history. My basic hypothesis is that it cannot be a coincidence that Jindabyne should give such prominence to the 
cultural problematic of the apology at this particular juncture in Australia’s history. Although this aspect of the 
film is scarcely mentioned in any of the reviews that accompanied the film’s premier, it strikes me that the timing is 
symptomatic: it is a topic that as Deleuze once said about difference was very much in the air. Produced only two 
years before the official national apology the Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd made to the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia on February 13, 2008, Jindabyne responds to a complex assemblage of cultural problematics 
that have been on the national political agenda ever since the release in 1995 of Bringing Them Home, the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s report on its national inquiry into the so-called “Stolen Generation”. 
KEYWORDS: Race; Australian Politics; Indigenous Rights; National Allegory; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
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The world is a set of symptoms whose illness 
merges with man.  
Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical 
 
█ Deleuze’s “clinical” method 
 
IN THIS ONE TANTALISING SENTENCE Gilles 
Deleuze sets forth an entire program of study 
and though he would turn to it again and 
again he never tackled it in anything like the 
same systematic manner he approached his 
other projects.
1
  
I would argue Essays Critical and Clinical, 
which appeared two years before his death, is 
more a tacit admission of failure than the 
summation of a project it pretends to be. The 
essays it collects, which were written over the 
span of a couple of decades, make two things 
very clear: first, the notion of “the clinical” 
preoccupied Deleuze for a long time – it un-
derpins his early books on Proust and Masoch 
and is central to his interest in Kafka (his pas-
sion for Proust and Kafka was shared by 
Guattari, an important point of commonality 
between them rarely if ever mentioned); se-
cond, despite several attempts to deploy the 
notion of “the clinical” for critical purposes, 
Deleuze never succeeded in overcoming the 
project’s principal theoretical problem, name-
ly the problem of causation. 
Perhaps like the clinicians he mentions, 
such as Roger and Parkinson, who identified 
diseases but never solved the question of their 
causation, it is enough for him that literature is 
able to make us aware of certain cultural “syn-
dromes” and there is no need, or indeed any 
expectation that they should also disclose the 
causes of these syndromes.
2
 But my sense is 
that Deleuze was interested in the problem of 
causation – there are several passages on it scat-
tered throughout his work, particularly his col-
laborative work with Guattari – he just didn’t 
figure out how to solve to his satisfaction.
3
 In 
this sense, the clinical project should be regard-
ed as incomplete: it is an encounter with a 
problem, but not yet a full scale engagement 
with a problem. It is as much a problem with 
his work as it is a problem in his work. 
Problems in a work are not necessarily 
flaws, however, and it shouldn’t be thought 
that my purpose in saying that the clinical pro-
ject is problematic is intended as a critique. 
On the contrary, it is actually a way of saying 
that the clinical project is still worth thinking 
about. And I don’t mean this as the proverbial 
backhanded compliment. 
As Deleuze argues in Difference and Repeti-
tion, the first of his books in which, by his 
reckoning, he did his own philosophizing, 
problems are not simply there to be solved, 
after which they disappear. He describes this 
view of them as an illusion and argues that it 
reduces problems to phantoms. This in turn 
has a pernicious effect on the whole of thought, 
he argues, because it casts thinking (together 
with the truth and falsehood that thinking ad-
duces) as an activity that only commences with 
the search for solutions. 
 
According to this infantile prejudice, the 
master sets a problem, our task is to solve 
it, and the result is accredited true or false 
by a powerful authority. It is also a social 
prejudice with the visible interest of main-
taining us in an infantile state, which calls 
upon us to solve problems that come from 
elsewhere, consoling or distracting us by 
telling us that we have won simply by being 
able to respond.
4
 
 
In saying this, Deleuze’s aim is to establish 
the notion that problems are neither provi-
sional nor contingent; they are not some arbi-
trary hurdle that the solution dissipates more 
or less magically, there only to prop up the so-
lution that never budges from centre stage. 
Instead, Deleuze wants to position problems 
as the very source of truth in philosophy – 
they are «at once both the site of an originary 
truth and the genesis of a derived truth».
5
  
My point is that the fact Deleuze posed an 
interesting and remarkable problem he couldn’t 
solve does him no discredit. The onus is on us as 
inheritors of his legacy to continue with this pro-
ject and see if the problem cannot be made to 
yield a solution and still more truth.
6
 As I will try 
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to show in what follows, there are several good 
reasons why we should want to do this. 
Deleuze’s “clinical” hypothesis is that the 
literary text can be read as a kind of sympto-
matology of the world in which it is produced. 
Rather than revealing an author’s neuroses, 
which is how psychoanalysis generally treats 
literature, Deleuze’s hypothesis is that the 
work is the writer’s diagnosis of the world – 
Deleuze will even go so far as to say it is their 
indictment of the world.
7
  
By the same token, the writer doesn’t use 
the work to represent the world’s neuroses; 
that’s not how art is made according to 
Deleuze. The artist doesn’t make their art by 
trying to say in a direct way what’s wrong with 
the world – this would lead to bad, conceptual 
or programmatic art in Deleuze’s view. Nei-
ther the writer nor the work can be treated as 
“patients” Deleuze argues, and in that sense 
they cannot be “psychoanalysed”.  
Texts and authors have nothing to tell us 
about themselves, or how they were formed, 
they have no history (in the psychoanalytic 
sense). They can only speak to us about how 
they function and the world which produced 
them. Texts have surface, but no depth, which 
is why Deleuze often describes the analysis of 
texts as cartography. For authors, if they are 
great, are more like doctors than patients. We 
mean that they are themselves astonishing di-
agnosticians or symptomatologists.
8
  
The work of art doesn’t exhibit symptoms 
in the manner of a patient or a “case”, rather it 
isolates, identifies, and tabulates symptoms in 
the manner of a clinician or, what amounts to 
the same thing for Deleuze, a cartographer.
9
 
Symptoms are the contours of the world, its 
grooves, its hills and valleys, its diagram, as 
Deleuze also puts it.
10
  
This is especially true of authors like Mas-
och and Sade, whose work appears to be 
merely the outgrowth of their own peculiar 
sexual fantasies. To fail to appreciate that 
these authors, to focus only them for a mo-
ment, have something essential to tell us about 
Masochism and Sadism is, Deleuze argues, to 
neglect «the difference between the artist’s 
novel as a work of art and the neurotic’s nov-
el».
11
 
 
█ Symptoms and allegory 
 
Deleuze never discussed how symptoms are 
produced – I want to suggest that Fredric 
Jameson offers an answer to this question: his-
tory. In The Political Unconscious, which Jame-
son admits to being inspired by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, Jameson proposes that 
all literary works are allegories of their time, by 
which he means it is only by reconstructing the 
historical context in which the works are pro-
duced that we can fully understand them. By 
context Jameson means the intellectual cur-
rents of the times as well as the particular 
events and day to day circumstances.
12
 
History, as Jameson sees it, is an active 
force that every writer has to confront, so the 
choices they make in confronting that force – 
choices to do with how they construct their 
characters, the shape of the narratives, down 
to the style of their sentences – are sympto-
matic of the times because they way writers 
choose to confront history changes with time. 
Jameson’s authors are thus every bit as much 
clinicians as Deleuze’s, they are constantly 
producing symptomatologies, tabulating syn-
dromes and taking the temperature of their 
times (to borrow Jameson’s own analogy), the 
difference being that Jameson does not shy 
away from the question of causation.  
In what follows, then, I want to splice 
Deleuze’s clinical hypothesis with Jameson’s 
and explore the critical possibilities of that fu-
sion in relation to the Australian film Jinda-
byne (2006), which in my view is one of the 
most interesting creative works dealing with 
race relations in Australia. It is important, in 
my view, because its way of dealing with race 
is to examine ordinary Australians and more 
especially recent migrants assimilating them-
selves to Australian ways of living being al-
most casually racist, that is racist without a 
conscious antipathy towards the racial other.  
It is the racism of those people who declare 
“they’re not racists, but …”, it is the racism of 
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those people who think “race isn’t an issue for 
them, but…”, it is the racism of those people 
who, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, don’t see 
others, they just see people who are not like 
themselves.
13
 
My starting point is this: It cannot be a co-
incidence that this film should give such 
prominence to the cultural problematic of the 
apology at this particular juncture in Austral-
ia’s history. Although this aspect of the film is 
scarcely mentioned in any of the reviews that 
accompanied the film’s premier, it strikes me 
that the timing is symptomatic: it is a topic 
that as Deleuze once said about difference was 
very much in the air.  
Produced only two years before the official 
national apology the Prime Minister of Aus-
tralia Kevin Rudd made to the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia on February 13, 2008, 
Jindabyne responds to a complex assemblage 
of cultural problematics that have been on the 
national political agenda ever since the release 
in 1995 of Bringing Them Home, the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s 
report on its national inquiry into the so-
called “Stolen Generation” of indigenous peo-
ple who as children were removed from their 
families and placed with white foster families.  
For over a decade and a half, and still to-
day, the issue of whether the government 
should issue an apology to these children and 
what that would mean has been the subject of 
widespread public debate in Australia, at all 
levels of society. A national apology was one 
of the key recommendations of the report, but 
it took more than a decade – effectively the 
length of time Prime Minister John Howard 
was in power – for it to be acted on.  
Howard’s rationale was that the present 
generation could not be expected to apologise 
for acts they themselves were not responsible 
for and did not themselves commit, though 
perhaps the real reason was that he simply did 
not want to expose the government to possible 
reparations claims. Rudd’s apology did not con-
front the questions of blame or responsibility 
and quite deliberately steered clear of any sug-
gestion that it could be seen as the precursor to 
reparations. As such, February 13, 2008 marks 
the moment of a lost opportunity, or better yet, 
that of an event that did not take place.  
As welcome as the apology was, it did 
nothing material to alter the living conditions 
of indigenous Australians. The reason for this 
is obviously complex, but central to it, I will 
argue, is the fact that it did not confront the 
foundational “crime”, if you will, that enabled 
the removal of children from their families, 
namely the act of dispossession that occurred 
when the putative First Settlers planted their 
flag at Sydney Cove and claimed the land as 
their own. The legacy of this dispossession 
continues to inform and give shape to the lives 
of all indigenous Australians in ways that are 
both obvious and not so obvious.  
As has been amply documented, the Aus-
tralian government’s treatment of the indige-
nous people since the occupation began in 
1788 has been nothing less than appalling. 
While statistics can never do justice to the ac-
tual pain and suffering endured by the victims, 
it is nevertheless sobering to confront the 
stark reality that today, as Tatz puts it, the in-
digenous people are  
 
at the very top, or bottom, of every social in-
dicator available: top of the medical statistics 
for diseases they didn’t exhibit as recently as 
thirty years ago – coronary disease, cancer, 
diabetes, respiratory infections; bottom of 
the life expectancy table, at 50-55 years or 
less for males and around 55 for females; 
with much greater rates of unemployment, 
much lower home ownership and considera-
bly lower per capita income; an arrest and 
imprisonment rate grossly out of proportion 
to their numbers.
14
 
 
And although things are changing and the 
actual living conditions and opportunities to 
flourish for indigenous people are improving, 
their position at the top and bottom of all such 
metrics hasn’t altered at all. Against this back-
ground, then, I want to suggest that Jindabyne 
can usefully be read as a national allegory (in 
Jameson’s sense of the word).
15
 It maps or di-
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agrams the cultural and political tropes of the 
present moment in history.  
The third feature film by the decidedly 
non-prolific Australian director Ray Law-
rence, whose other credits include Bliss (1985), 
from a Peter Carey novel and Lantana (2001), 
from Andrew Bovell’s award winning play 
Speaking in Tongues (1996). Adapted by Beat-
rix Christian from Raymond Carver’s short 
story ‘So much water so close to home’ (1981), 
Jindabyne is a slight departure from Bliss and 
Lantana in that it is the work of an American 
writer rather than an Australian, but its focus 
is as keenly Australian as his previous works.
16
  
The film transposes Carver’s story from 
ex-urban California to a small town in rural 
New South Wales, namely Jindabyne. The lo-
cation is significant or – to use a word not 
much in fashion these days – overdetermined 
because in the 1960s the original town of 
Jindabyne was relocated to make way for a 
dam (as part of the Snowy River hydroelectric 
scheme). Now almost completely forgotten, 
the old town of Jindabyne lurks beneath the 
water as an obvious metaphor for the uncer-
tain way the present and the past coexist in 
contemporary Australia.
17
  
Like the Carver story, Jindabyne is about a 
group of four men (Gabriel Byrne, John How-
ard, Stelios Yiakmis, and Simon Stone) who go 
on a fly-fishing trip which takes an unexpected 
turn. The men discover the half-naked body of a 
young Aboriginal woman floating in the river, 
but decide not to report it to the police straight-
away because to do so would interrupt their 
plans for a relaxing couple of days of sport. 
When the men return from their weekend 
away and finally report their grisly find, word 
of what they did – or, more precisely, failed to 
do – leaks out and they find themselves being 
called to account by family, friends and indeed 
the whole town, but are unable, at least the 
first instance, to recognise that what they did 
was wrong. The resonance here with Austral-
ia’s response to the national apology to the In-
digenous people is unmistakable.  
The film’s symptomatology is brought into 
view in four key moments: the first is opening 
scene of the film in which we see a young abo-
riginal woman abducted and we presume 
murdered (we don’t see the actual murder, but 
it is obvious that is what happened); second, 
the discovery of the body and the failure to 
act; third, the denial that a wrong occurred 
and the refusal to accept that there is any need 
for an apology; fourth, recognition that a 
wrong did occur and the offer of an apology. 
The whole story turns on the second mo-
ment and our shock at the fact that the four 
men choose to do nothing, but in some ways 
the first moment is more significant. It is worth 
noting, on this point, that this opening se-
quence isn’t found in the original Carver story.  
So it is clearly intended to give the film as a 
whole a very specific kind of foundation, yet 
in doing so it doesn’t conform to our expecta-
tions. As with the discovery of the body, the 
significance of the first moment lies more in 
what didn’t happen than what did happen. 
Obviously the murder of a young Aboriginal 
woman is not unimportant, but what is note-
worthy about this scene is the way it seems to 
set up a generic murder-mystery narrative in 
which the guilty are located and brought to 
justice. But this doesn’t eventuate – the mur-
derer isn’t brought to justice, indeed there isn’t 
even an attempt to identify or locate him.  
One can imagine that the reason the crea-
tors of the film didn’t incorporate this story-
line into the film was precisely to avoid turn-
ing it into a murder-mystery. Whatever the 
reason for this decision, it sets up a very inter-
esting national allegorical frame for the film 
inasmuch as it situates the whole story in the 
context of a foundational act of violence 
against an indigenous person that, like the 
founding of the nation itself, is placed outside 
the realm of justice. 
When the four fishermen discover the 
body we expect them to call the police imme-
diately. This is as much a generic expectation 
as a cultural expectation in that this is what is 
supposed to happen in movies: the discovery 
of a body is supposed to initiate action. But in 
this case the very opposite happens.  
The discovery of the body is met with a 
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powerful form of inertia, which is resonant of 
the way most Australians respond to the situa-
tion of Australia’s indigenous people. But the 
inaction of most Australians in the face of the 
appalling living conditions of Australia’s in-
digenous people attracts little or no moral rep-
robation, whereas when the four fisherman 
decide not to act we automatically judge them 
to be morally and ethically culpable. But on 
what grounds do we make this judgement? 
Why does it matter so much that they fail to 
contact the police? To put it another way, 
what is the nature of the obligation on them to 
act that they fail to fulfil?  
The answer to this question is not immedi-
ately obvious, but our sense of indignation at 
the men’s inaction and their apparently cal-
lous disregard for the needs of the dead sug-
gests quite strongly that culturally we assume 
in whatever inchoate form that the dead im-
pose an obligation on us to grieve or mourn 
the extinction of a life.  
In western culture, grieving is supposed to 
take the form of an interruption of one’s daily 
activities, one’s plans, particularly if they are 
leisure oriented, to mark the passing of a life, 
and this is of course precisely what the four 
men fail to do. They observe none of the ex-
pected “rites” that we are supposed to perform 
in the face of death. Not only do they not re-
port the death to the authorities as we expect 
them to, they also continue to enjoy their day, 
indeed their weekend, as though death had not 
touched them in any way. And indeed, that is 
undoubtedly what is most troubling about their 
response – death does not seem to touch them.  
The body is seen simply as a problem, right 
down to whether it should be left in the water 
or not. Ultimately they decide not to remove 
the body because it is less likely to putrefy in 
the cool river water, but they tie it down so it 
doesn’t float away. They treat the dead young 
woman then as so much meat, a mere corpse, 
a body without a face. 
 
█ The face of the other 
 
What does it mean to say the corpse lacks a 
face? We can only answer this question by 
first of all asking what it means to have a face. 
According to Lévinas
18
 the face signifies the 
presence of the Other, namely, that which re-
minds us that we are social beings unable to 
survive alone on this planet and, as such, obliged 
to consider how we may preserve their life. More 
than that, the face calls upon me to meet my eth-
ical obligations to the Other. Its call, Lévinas ar-
gues, is unignorable. Given that the men seem 
unmoved by the corpse – yes, they are shocked, 
but no they aren’t moved by it, they do not per-
form any of the expected rituals in response to 
their discovery – we might conclude that in Lé-
vinasian terms the dead aboriginal woman lacks 
a face; or, to put it even more strongly, she 
somehow lacks alterity.  
Paradoxically, then, it is as though she is 
not other enough. Her presence seems not to 
impose any immediate or strongly felt ethical 
demands on the four fishermen. One cannot 
help but think that Lawrence’s decision to 
make the victim Aboriginal (and not white as 
in the original Carver story) was intended to 
make us ask whether the men would have act-
ed differently if the corpse had not been black. 
That this question is even conceivable is in it-
self an indictment on the state of race rela-
tions in Australia because it assumes that 
there is a profound schism in Australia be-
tween the hegemonic “white” or “non-
Aboriginal” population and the Aboriginal 
people and that this schism does indeed have a 
moral and ethical dimension to it.  
We cannot know if the men would have 
acted differently if they’d found a white 
corpse, but we can say that they do not appear 
to grieve the loss of life that they are witness 
to and appear not to have any sense that they 
ought to grieve, where grieving would mean 
interrupting their daily routines and plans in 
order to take time to feel the loss of life and to 
perform the socially prescribed rituals of 
mourning.  
As it turns out, feeling is the last thing they 
want to do – they respond by rendering them-
selves insensible with alcohol. They are shocked 
by their discovery, but they react to it in the 
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same way that one might react to the news that 
one’s flight has been cancelled – it is an incon-
venience rather than an occasion for grief. 
This absence of grief is, as Judith Butler’s 
recent work argues, ethically and politically 
significant because, as she puts it, it is only 
when the loss of life matters that the value of 
life becomes apparent. «Only under conditions 
in which loss would matter does the value of 
the life appear. Thus, grievability is a presuppo-
sition for the life that matters».
19
 As I’ve said 
already, this is what is so striking about this 
moment in the story – the men do not appre-
hend the life that was lost as grievable, as mat-
tering. Butler puts it even more strongly. 
 
Without grievability, there is no life, or, ra-
ther, there is something living that is other 
than life. Instead, ‘there is a life that will 
never have been lived’, sustained by no re-
gard, no testimony, and ungrieved when 
lost. The apprehension of grievability pre-
cedes and makes possible the apprehension 
of precarious life.
20
 
 
Following Butler’s logic here, we may 
speculate that the dead Aboriginal woman is 
not grieved because she is not perceived to 
have had a life; that is to say, because she is 
Aboriginal her life is invisible to the white 
men who discover her corpse. Her identity is 
her face and because of that it is a featureless 
face incapable of inciting an ethical response. 
«An ungrievable life is one that cannot be 
mourned because it has never lived, that is, it 
has never counted as a life at all».
21
  
The men’s inaction says nothing so clearly 
as this: the dead Aboriginal woman did not 
count to them – she was dead to them before 
she died. Lawrence amplifies the poignancy of 
this moment by giving one of the four men 
(Stelios Yiakmis) an Aboriginal girlfriend 
(Leah Purcell), as though to say he at least 
should have felt something, even if the others 
didn’t, and this certainly how his girlfriend re-
sponds.  
In Butler’s terms, the men’s response is 
significant because as she conceives it moral 
responsibility presupposes affect – it is only 
because we are moved emotionally that we act 
ethically she argues. If we aren’t moved to act 
ethically by our grief for the plight of the oth-
er, then we will not do so.  
Her hypothesis, which she acknowledges is 
not entirely new, is that «whether and how we 
respond to the suffering of others, how we 
formulate moral criticisms, how we articulate 
political analyses, depends upon a certain field 
of perceptible reality having already been es-
tablished».
22
 We have to “see” the Other in 
order to be moved by them. Blindness to the 
Other is not merely unethical in this respect, 
but the absence of the very possibility of eth-
ics. But this blindness is never purely personal; 
it is a product of social and cultural framing.  
The fact that the four men fail to respond to 
the discovery of the corpse in the manner we 
might expect of them cannot be put down to a 
sheer quirk of character, then, but has to be 
treated as symptomatic of the frame – the soci-
ety – that produced them. The four men re-
sponded as they did because the Aboriginal 
woman was not perceptible in their field of vi-
sion – she was not alive to them in any sense of 
the word.  
How we respond to the world, the kinds of 
moral and ethical choices we make, is condi-
tioned by what she refers to, drawing very 
loosely on Goffman, as the “frames” in which 
our own lives are situated. The frame is a so-
cial and cultural formation like Bourdieu’s 
habitus that the individual subject internalises 
without ever being aware of having done so.  
This amounts to saying that in a certain 
sense our affect is not our own, it is socially 
conditioned, or to use Butler’s preferred term, 
it is framed.
23
 Understanding how this frame 
is constituted then becomes central to any un-
derstanding of ethics for Butler. She writes: 
  
In particular I want to understand how the 
frames that allocate the recognisability of 
certain figures of the human are them-
selves linked with broader norms that de-
termine what will and will not be a grieve-
able life.
24
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Butler thus stipulates that compassion is 
the true wellspring of ethics, which may well 
be so but nevertheless poses insuperable prob-
lems for the construction of an ethics whose 
principles could, in the best Kantian sense, be 
applied universally and uniformly.  
What should we do, for example, in the case 
where our sense of compassion deserts us, as it 
apparently does for the four fishermen? Butler’s 
way round this problem is to try to determine 
how and under what conditions compassion 
fails, but this is not a solution so much as the 
opening up of a different kind of problem. 
Asking why people are not compassionate 
is not the same kind of project as determining 
what would count as project: the former is an 
anthropological inquiry (that may well be in-
flected by both sociology and psychology), 
while the later is a philosophical project.  
From a philosophical perspective, ethics 
cannot (and should not) be based on the pres-
ence or absence of compassion because this 
rules out the possibility of constructing an eth-
ics on the basis of purely intellectual or “af-
fectless” abstract grounds.  
The main reason for this is that there are 
plenty of situations one can imagine when af-
fect might fail us, at least insofar as the elabo-
ration of an ethics is concerned. For example, 
I may feel very compassionate towards ani-
mals but nevertheless have no problem eating 
meat in the full knowledge that an animal had 
to die to provide my meal. My compassion 
does not guarantee or even necessarily lead to 
an ethical reaction or response on my part. 
And more importantly, from cultural and so-
cial point of view, there is no perceivable flaw 
in my “frame” for acting in this way.  
The same impossible problem is raised by 
the issue of abortion: my compassion for all 
human life is contradicted if I accept the ne-
cessity for abortion. If, by the same token, I 
am compassionate about the needs of the in-
dividuals whose lives are affected by unwant-
ed pregnancy then I might want to make an 
exception to my “rule” regarding compassion 
for all life.  
At this point affect ceases to be of any use 
and the ethical decision one arrives at has to 
be arrived at by reason. As such, we have to 
call into question the so-called “corporeal 
turn” in cultural studies and ask whether it is 
really taking us in a direction that we want to 
go. Having said, I am obviously in agreement 
with Butler that the absence of an ethical re-
sponse can and should be treated as the symp-
tom of a particular kind of cultural or social 
problem. 
  
█ The ethics of the apology 
 
This brings us to the third narrative mo-
ment of the film, which is in many ways the 
most interesting and the most troubling. 
When the men return from their fishing trip 
and finally report their discovery, their inac-
tion is met with shock and disbelief, particu-
larly from their friends and family.  
At this point of the story, in both the 
Carver and Lawrence versions, the point of 
view of the story switches over to Stewart’s 
wife, Claire (Laura Linney), who is literally 
disgusted by her husband’s inaction.  
This disgust is sexualised inasmuch as 
Stewart informs Claire of what happened on 
his fishing trip only after he’d first had sex 
with her. In the Carver story she is haunted by 
thoughts of the dead girl and in some strange 
way identifies with her, thus doubling her an-
ger towards her husband. She wonders if 
Stewart was thinking about the dead girl 
whilst making love to her and all but accuses 
him of necrophilia.  
Her response is important because it sug-
gests that there are two quite different dimen-
sions to the national apology: on the one 
hand, there is the socio-psychological dimen-
sion, the felt need to expiate guilt, self-
reproach and shame; while on the other hand, 
there is the political dimension, the ac-
ceptance of responsibility and the offer to 
make amends. Claire’s response to her hus-
band’s inaction takes both routes.  
By contrast, Rudd’s apology was very much 
of the first variety – it very carefully steered a 
course that kept it clear of the political dimen-
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sion and played up the socio-psychological 
dimension. The fact that a substantial number 
of Australians did not share the feelings of 
remorse Rudd expressed on their behalf raises 
the interesting question of how they might 
have responded to a more straightforward po-
litical mea culpa.  
Claire is ashamed of her husband and his 
friends and she tries to atone for that shame 
by first of all trying to make contact with the 
dead girl’s family and then, more concretely, 
by raising money to pay for the funeral. Her 
fundraising efforts are viewed with suspicion 
by the townsfolk, who would generally prefer 
that she let matters lie. Her husband Stewart 
(Gabriel Byrne), whose decision it was to con-
tinue fishing, is seemingly incapable of under-
standing that what they did was wrong, and is 
baffled and incensed by her actions: «Tell me 
what I did wrong and I’ll listen».
25
 
Crucially the Claire character is an immi-
grant, as though to say only someone from 
outside of the frame of Australian cultural and 
political life is capable of seeing the truth and 
feeling the shame of it. Perhaps, too, it is 
meant to remind us that all Australians, with 
the exception of the Indigenous Peoples, are 
immigrants.  
Importantly, it is the actions of her hus-
band and his friends that shame her, actions 
that she is not personally responsible for, but 
nevertheless feels responsible before (to use 
Deleuze’s important distinction).  
Shame is in this sense a necessary comple-
ment of grief – there where grief was, so 
shame should follow. Shame is what grief be-
comes when we take responsibility for the loss 
of life that grieves us. Shame transforms the 
socio-psychological into the political. Without 
this transformation, grief is always at risk of 
becoming melancholia, an indulgence in the 
pleasure of being sad (as Victor Hugo memo-
rably defined it).  
Butler’s work spans this spectrum from 
grief to mourning, but omits any considera-
tion of shame as a philosophical concept – she 
treats shame as the conservative’s weapon 
against the culturally marginalised. Shame is, 
on this view, a destructive emotion that leaves 
people feeling unable to enjoy their life or feel 
secure in being who they are.  
Her examples, drawn largely from the ex-
periences of people who have been persecuted 
because of their gender, race, sexuality, or reli-
gion, do tend to bear this out. Her most telling 
example in this regard is the US military’s uti-
lisation of shame as an instrument of torture 
at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo.
26
 Yet, one 
might also say that it is precisely because of 
the absence of shame on the part of the perpe-
trators that these hurtful acts of shaming can 
occur. 
It is in fact the power of shame that finally 
compels the four men to acknowledge that 
they had in fact committed a wrong for which 
some form of amends was necessary. The dif-
ficulty the men have in recognising that what 
they did was wrong mirrors Australia’s own 
difficulty in accepting its actions toward the 
Indigenous Peoples constitutes a wrong. 
The major source of this difficulty is the fact 
that they themselves were not responsible for 
the woman’s death – yes, they neglected her 
dead body when they discovered it, but ulti-
mately that is unimportant in face of the larger 
crime, namely her murder, and they had no part 
in that. The logic here is similar to what Roland 
Barthes described as the “inoculation” strategy 
which consists of admitting to a “small” crime so 
as to conceal a “big” crime.
27
  
Of course, the men did not commit the 
murder, so they cannot be expected to confess 
to this, but the woman’s murder is not the on-
ly wrong at issue here. There is the wrong im-
plicit in the very “frame” in which the men 
find themselves; their utter disregard for the 
life of the Aboriginal woman, evidenced by 
their inability to grieve for her, is testament to 
a much greater prior wrong, namely that of 
racism itself. Not only do the four men not 
grieve the death of the Aboriginal woman 
whose body they found, they do not notice 
their lack of grief, and it is this absence that is 
the more telling of the two.  
It is against this standpoint that former 
Prime Minister John Howard’s insistence that 
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the present generation cannot be expected to 
take responsibility for the actions of previous 
generations must be rejected as both unjust 
and more importantly false.  
This brings us to the fourth narrative mo-
ment of the film, the apology itself. The four 
men attend the funeral of the murdered wom-
an, which is conducted by the family in tradi-
tional fashion.  
Stewart attempts to make an apology on 
behalf of the group and a young Aboriginal 
man confronts him and spits on him. From a 
national allegory perspective this moment is in 
many ways the most crucial – two years before 
the official apology was made it anticipates 
how the Indigenous Peoples might be ex-
pected to respond to an apology that is in real-
ity too little too late.  
Of course the apology was important and 
many within the Indigenous community wel-
comed it, but that does not mean we should 
not criticize it. The National Apology when it 
was finally given was addressed specifically to 
the “Stolen Generations” for the treatment 
they had suffered.  
And while there can be no question that 
they were owed an apology, at the very least, 
they were not the only ones owed an apology, 
nor were their experiences the only experienc-
es the Indigenous Peoples suffered for which 
an apology might conceivably be owed (the 
loss of their land, forced displacement from 
their land, genocide, and so on, the list of 
crimes is long).  
As wrong as the Australian government 
was in removing children from their families, 
behind that wrong there is an even greater 
wrong, which like the proverbial elephant in 
the room has been studiously ignored by all 
Australian governments.  
I want to suggest that the apology to the 
“Stolen Generations” was hollow without an 
accompanying apology for the act of dispos-
session that created the conditions under 
which it could have occurred.  
As Agamben shows in his discussion of 
Nazi Germany’s extermination of European 
Jewry, it is the act of dispossession, which 
should be understood to mean dispossession 
from the realm of rights and law, which cre-
ates the conditions of possibility for the latter 
in all its actual brutality. As Agamben writes,  
 
It is impossible to grasp the specificity of 
the National Socialist concept of race – 
and, with it, the peculiar vagueness and in-
consistency that characterize it – if one 
forgets that the biopolitical body that con-
stitutes the new fundamental political sub-
ject is neither a quaestio facti (for example, 
the identification of a certain biological 
body) nor a quaestio iuris (the identifica-
tion of a certain juridical rule to be ap-
plied), but rather the site of a sovereign po-
litical decision that operates in the absolute 
indistinction of fact and law.
28
  
 
The sovereign political decision he is refer-
ring to is the proclamation on February 28, 
1933, of the so-called “decree for the protec-
tion of the people and the State” which set in 
place a permanent state of exception in which 
all the previously existing laws protecting per-
sonal liberty, freedom of expression, and so 
on, were suspended indefinitely. It was this 
suspension of laws protecting the rights of cit-
izens, and indeed the right to citizenship that 
opened the way for the creation of the concen-
tration camps – as the head of the Gestapo 
noted, no official decree was needed to bring 
the camps into existence since there was no 
law to impede their creation. The camps effec-
tively gave a specific spatial arrangement to 
what had become (since February 28, 1933) a 
generalised state of affairs affecting the whole 
of Germany.
29
 
 
The paradoxical status of the camp as a 
space of exception must be considered. 
The camp is a piece of land placed outside 
the normal juridical order, but it is never-
theless not simply an external space. What 
is excluded in the camp is, according to the 
etymological sense of the term “exception” 
(ex-capere), taken outside, included through 
its own exclusion. But what is first of all 
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taken into the juridical order is the state of 
exception itself. Insofar as the state of ex-
ception is “willed”, it inaugurates a new ju-
ridico-political paradigm in which the 
norm becomes indistinguishable from the 
exception. The camp is the structure in 
which the state of exception – the possibil-
ity of deciding on which founds sovereign 
power is realised normally.
30
 
 
I have quoted this at length because what I 
want to propose is that the declaration of terra 
nullius should be considered in the same way: 
it too declares a state of exception in which 
the sovereign gives themselves the right to de-
termine who is to be included and who is to be 
excluded.  
By declaring the land “empty” or “vacant” 
the colonialists gave themselves the right to 
occupy land they could see was “owned” by 
somebody else; the casuistry concerning the 
definition of “occupied” was simply their way 
of bringing the “facts” into alignment with the 
“law”, but obviously had no influence on their 
actual decision to occupy the land. It created 
legal dispossession as an organising frame.  
The issue concerning the right to occupy 
the land was determined after the fact and was 
only an issue at all to the occupiers because 
they did not want to have to share their terri-
torial booty with other European nations who 
might happen along and decide to stake out a 
claim as well. The right to occupy was from 
the start a right to exclude.  
The colonialists imposed the same model 
of right on foreign lands that was exercised 
over their own – the sovereign has the abso-
lute right to declare an exception to any laws 
that they have previously upheld. This per-
haps explains why it didn’t trouble the con-
sciences of the men who conjured this juridi-
co-political foundation stone out of thin air.  
Terra nullius did not so much deny the 
prior ownership of the land by its Indigenous 
Peoples as exclude them from the State that 
established itself on their land; or, to put it an-
other way, it determined that henceforth they 
would only be part of the State as its excluded. 
That is to say, as Agamben might put it, follow-
ing the declaration of Terra nullius the Indige-
nous Peoples of Australia were included in the 
State that established itself on their land 
through their exclusion. And that is how the 
Indigenous people of Australia have been treat-
ed ever since Captain Phillip planted his flag at 
Sydney Cove on January 26, 1788. 
 
█ Terra nullius  
 
This is why the apparent overturning of 
terra nullius by the High Court judgement in 
Mabo vs. Queensland in June1992, while im-
portant, did not change the excluded status of 
Indigenous people as much as might have 
been expected, or indeed as much as has been 
claimed.  
To put it in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, 
terra nullius is the content of the form – it is 
the particular shape the state of exception 
took in the establishment of Australia as a 
sovereign, colonial nation, not the formative, 
originary instrument it is often taken to be. 
That distinction must be reserved for the sov-
ereign right to declare a state of exception and 
as the years since Mabo have shown all too 
clearly, that right is intact now as it ever was.  
The state of exception is the form of the 
content in other words. Contrary to the 
standard view of things, then, I am arguing 
that terra nullius is the expression of sover-
eignty, not its basis.
31
 It was a convenient 
means of legitimating at law (by suspending 
the “existing” law of the land) what had al-
ready been accomplished in fact. Indeed, as is 
the case with most declarations of a state of 
exception, it is the fact that demands the sus-
pension of law – confronted by the need to 
justify their act of occupation, the colonial 
powers declared the land terra nullius in order 
to retain their entitlement to the land by sus-
pending their own laws regarding the right to 
occupy another person’s land.  
This is clear in the judgement that so-
called Native title can co-exist alongside 
Crown title, but the Crown reserves the right to 
extinguish it. So the judgement is in effect a 
Symptomatology and Racial Politics in Australia 
 
121 
case of yet another exception being made under 
the auspices of an already existing state of ex-
ception. This is further confirmed by the fact 
that the judgement also found that the previous 
failure to recognise Native title, as regrettably 
and egregiously racist as it undoubtedly was, 
did not constitute the legal basis for any future 
compensation claim. Putting it bluntly, it 
amounts to saying that while terra nullius was 
wrong as law, it was not a wrong at law. 
The Australian government has shown it-
self to be profoundly unwilling to treat the In-
digenous peoples as ordinary citizens, or in-
deed as individuals, with the same rights and 
needs as other Australians. Instead, in a man-
ner that stands comparison with Israel’s 
treatment of Palestinians, it insists on treating 
the Indigenous Peoples as a race apart. It justi-
fies its stance with a duty of care rhetoric, but 
as the “Stolen Generations” make plain its 
model of care is largely unconcerned by the 
plight of the individual.  
The policy of removing “half-caste” chil-
dren from their Aboriginal families and plac-
ing them with white foster families that creat-
ed the ‘Stolen generations’ was in its own way 
well-intentioned inasmuch as it was designed 
to address a specific cultural “problem”, a 
problem that the government felt it had a re-
sponsibility to address: as neither fully white, 
nor fully black, it was thought by the white 
policy makers that “half-caste” children had 
no ‘proper’ place within the caste system of 
(post-)colonial society.
 32
  
But such a policy idea could only have been 
ennacted because the Indigenous peoples were 
literally non-citizens.
33
 More than that, it 
could only have happened because the policy-
makers viewed things from the perspective of 
some notional “greater good” – the good of 
the nation and the good of the race – that 
rendered the misery endured by the children 
as so much collateral damage.  
The historical sleight of hand here is the 
policy-maker’s presumption that the situation 
of the “half-castes” was exceptional, thus re-
quiring and legitimising exceptional actions 
on their part. But one has only to try to imag-
ine a similar policy being framed for use on 
the hegemonic “white” Australian population 
to realise that the reality is that such excep-
tional action could only be taken because as 
“half” Aboriginal people they were “always al-
ready” locked into an exceptional situation. 
Putting it bluntly, it was only because they 
were already members of “the excluded” part 
that has no part that they could be treated in 
the way they were.  
The government intervenes into the lives of 
Indigenous Australians not only because it has 
the right and the wherewithal to do so, but be-
cause ever since First Settlement the Indige-
nous Peoples have been regarded as “bare life”.  
The persistence of this viewpoint – that 
the government has the right to intervene the 
lives of Indigenous Australians – was amply 
demonstrated by the extraordinary events of 
June 2007 that have become known simply as 
The Intervention.
34
 Prompted by the release of 
the Little Children Are Sacred report prepared 
by the specially convened Northern Territory 
Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aborig-
inal Children from Sexual Abuse (2007), the 
“Intervention” refers to former Prime Minister 
John Howard’s ill-fated decision to send mili-
tary personnel into several Indigenous com-
munities and impose what amounted to martial 
law in the lead up to the 2007 Federal election. 
Howard argued that the government not only 
had a right but also a duty to intervene, 
likening the situation to a national emergency 
of the order of “Hurricane Katrina”. 
The comparison might not have sounded 
so misplaced if it also came with the admission 
that if the problem is a national emergency 
then it is so because the Federal government 
has systematically failed to heed all warnings 
of an impending crisis and diverted the neces-
sary funds to address the issue elsewhere. As 
Rebecca Stringer explains, Howard deflected 
criticism of his policies by saying that the chil-
dren in aboriginal communities are living in a 
Hobbesian nightmare that must be remedied 
by the imposition of «social order enforced by 
legitimate authority».
35
 
While the report was unequivocal in find-
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ing that the incidence of sexual abuse in some 
Aboriginal communities is at crisis level and 
that the matter should be treated as one of na-
tional significance, nowhere in the report is 
there a recommendation calling for an imme-
diate and militarised intervention, and yet 
that is precisely the course Howard chose in 
formulating the Northern Territory National 
Emergency Response (NTNER).  
On the contrary, the report specifically 
recommended extensive consultation with in-
digenous communities and a systematic at-
tempt to end the chronic, real material depri-
vation these communities endure by improv-
ing government service levels to them.
36
  
If the NTNER proved politically toxic for 
Howard, I would argue that it wasn’t because 
he asserted the government’s right to inter-
vene into the affairs of indigenous people and 
both curtail their rights and deny them their 
livelihoods; rather, I would suggest it was be-
cause it exposed too openly the depth of the 
government’s responsibility for their plight.  
It made all too apparent what had other-
wise been forgotten, namely that the founding 
of the nation was an act of violent disposses-
sion. Rudd needed to offer an apology not on-
ly to distance himself from Howard, but also 
to close down any debate about the govern-
ment’s right to decide the fate of the Indige-
nous Peoples of Australia. And it is notewor-
thy that his apology makes no apology for this 
– he apologises for the wrongs done to the In-
digenous People, but not for the dispossession 
of their land that not only led to these wrongs 
being committed, but gave the perpetrators 
the sense that they had the right to commit 
these wrongs.  
What makes Jindabyne so interesting, to 
me at least, is the way it exposes and explores 
this schism in the core of the national apology. 
The apology follows a double refusal: first, 
there is a refusal to accept that a wrong has 
occurred; then, as the evidence mounts and it 
becomes impossible to deny that a wrong has 
occurred, there is a refusal to accept any blame 
for the wrong. The apology that follows is 
thereby rendered worthless in advance be-
cause it fails to meet its own minimum condi-
tions of possibility – as defined by Derrida – 
namely that it follows both an admission that 
a wrong occurred and an acceptance of re-
sponsibility for that wrong.
37
  
The national apology to the Indigenous 
Peoples has taken precisely this course too – 
first, there was a refusal to accept that a wrong 
has occurred; when the “Stolen Generations” 
report made that position untenable there was 
a steadfast refusal to accept responsibility for 
the wrongs documented in the report. And in 
this sense the apology that was offered by 
Rudd was basically worthless, irrespective of 
its supposed symbolic value, because it did not 
acknowledge the founding violence that for 
many continues to underpin the government’s 
right to commit these wrongs as the NTNER 
demonstrated all too clearly. 
Viewed as a national allegory, Jindabyne is 
asking us to look at the countless instances 
where Aboriginal people have been treated as 
the socially dead, as the non-living, as leading 
lives that do not count as lives. Bringing Them 
Home catalogued hundreds of actual examples 
and even then only scratched the surface. The 
point I want to make here in conclusion 
though is not simply that the hegemonic white 
people of Australia treat the marginalised 
black people of Australia very poorly; that is 
obviously the case. There is, however, an even 
more disturbing point to be made and that is 
that the hegemonic white people of Australia 
are for the most part unaware that there is an-
ything “wrong” in the way they act. Like the 
four fisherman, they do not think they have 
anything to apologise for and are awaiting 
someone to tell them what they’ve done 
wrong. One wonders if they’ll listen. 
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